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ABSTRACT
Anthropocentric biases manifest themselves in two different ways in 
research on animal cognition. Some researchers claim that only hu-
mans have the capacity for reasoning, beliefs, and interests; and oth-
ers attribute mental concepts to nonhuman animals on the basis of be-
havioral evidence, and they conceive of animal cognition in more or 
less human terms. Both approaches overlook the fact that language-
use deeply informs mental states, such that comparing human mental 
states to the mental states of nonlinguistic animals is misguided. In 
order to avoid both pitfalls — assuming that animals have mental 
lives just like we do, or assuming that they have no mental lives at 
all — I argue for a functional methodological approach. Researchers 
should study animal cognition by identifying environmental inputs, 
the functional role of internal states, and behavioral outputs. Doing so 
will allow for cross-species comparisons in a way that the use of folk 
psychological terms does not.
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“If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.” 
— Ludwig Wittgenstein
Introduction
Some of the most influential Western philosophers, includ-
ing Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, have distin-
guished human beings from nonhuman animals on the basis of 
mental phenomena. Although humans have a nonrational part 
to them (the body), they are different in kind from (nonhuman) 
animals because of their capacity to reason, their intellect, or 
their souls. Human beings are said to have minds, while ani-
mals are believed to be merely sophisticated biological ma-
chines whose behavior is driven by instinct and conditioned by 
external stimuli.
In the wake of Darwin, the continuity between humans and 
animals has been widely recognized, to the point where many 
contemporary philosophers and scientists attribute mental 
concepts, sometimes very sophisticated mental operations, to 
animals. In addition to the physical homologies arising from 
a common evolutionary ancestor, they claim that humans and 
some animals also share mental homologies, such as the ca-
pacity to feel pain and pleasure (Singer 2002); the having of 
interests, including a categorical interest in continuing to live 
(Regan 2004); the ability to categorize experiences based on 
abstract concepts (Vauclair 1996); causal reasoning (Call 
2006); an understanding of others’ mental states (Premack and 
Woodruff 1978); and even a kind of rudimentary moral agency 
(Bekoff and Pierce 2009).
These two groups of theorists come to very different conclu-
sions regarding the inner lives of animals: one group argues 
for humans’ uniqueness, and the other group identifies compa-
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rable mental traits in both humans and animals. Although these 
interpretations seem to contradict one another, both of them 
presuppose an underlying anthropocentrism regarding mental 
phenomena, and thus they fail to understand animal cognition 
as unique to its kind. Specifically, both groups approach ani-
mal cognition in terms of human-centered, folk psychological 
concepts, and then either attribute them to animals or deny that 
animals have them — anthropomorphism and anthropodenial 
(de Waal 1997), respectively.
In this paper, I argue that, in order not to mischaracterize ani-
mal cognition through the lens of anthropocentrism, we must 
avoid appealing to subjective mental states and instead use 
functional criteria to identify the continuities between humans 
and animals. That is, we must identify physiological states, in-
cluding brain states, that connect experimental stimuli and be-
havioral outputs, and make comparisons between species based 
on the functional role that they play. Only then can we avoid the 
pitfalls of anthropocentric thinking to which both approaches 
are susceptible.
Inhuman Beasts or Furry Humans?
The traditional approach to the human-animal divide is well 
known and needs no extended discussion here. It suffices to 
say that, for much of Western intellectual history, animals have 
served as a kind of foil against which we define ourselves (Der-
rida 2008; Oliver 2009). Unlike animals, humans are rational 
beings who use complex language, make ethically informed 
decisions, have a sense of history, and participate in culture. 
For example, Descartes (1637) describes animals as mere bod-
ies that lack souls and thus move by a kind of mechanical op-
eration, in contrast to humans, who also have immaterial souls 
and are capable of rational thinking and autonomous action.
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Descartes’s heirs among contemporary comparative psy-
chologists include Derek Penn, Jennifer Vonk, and Daniel Po-
vinelli, among others. For example, Povinelli and Vonk claim 
that the behavior of chimpanzees, unlike human behavior, can 
be explained in terms of relatively simple behavioral rules that 
they form based on observation of others’ behavior (rather than 
making inferences about others’ psychological states), and that 
their tool use and understanding of causal principles are differ-
ent from ours because of their inability to generalize from spe-
cific cases (Povinelli 2003; Povinelli and Vonk 2003; Povinelli 
and Vonk 2006; Lurz 2011). Penn and Povinelli conclude that 
“human minds” are “qualitatively different” from animals’ cog-
nitive faculties in several ways, especially because we, unlike 
animals, are able to “reinterpret” our experience conceptually 
“in terms of higher-order, structural, role-governed relations” 
(Penn et al. 2009). All of these theorists believe that humans 
are capable of a kind of abstract thinking that animals, even the 
most complex animals, are not.
Despite this longstanding tendency to define ourselves in op-
position to animals, there is a corresponding tendency (among 
both researchers and the general public) to assign humanlike 
qualities to nonhuman things, especially animals. For many 
scientists who study animal cognition, man is still the measure 
of all things in the sense that they reduce the complexity and 
uniqueness of animal life to something that we can describe 
in rational or human terms. For the most part, comparative 
psychologists reject Povinelli’s conclusions and commit them-
selves, implicitly or explicitly, to an argument by analogy: if 
mental states cause observable behaviors in human beings, then 
similar behaviors in animals must be caused by similar men-
tal states. The principle of parsimony, which, in the study of 
animal cognition, is traditionally identified as Morgan’s Canon 
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(1894, 53), has given way to what Frans de Waal, reflecting the 
current anthropocentric trend in comparative psychology, calls 
the principle of “evolutionary parsimony”: “if closely related 
species act the same, the underlying mental processes are prob-
ably the same, too” (de Waal 2006, 62). The assumption here 
is that animals who are like us, or who behave in similar ways, 
share similar subjective states, and that we can thus use the 
same mental concepts — beliefs, desires, and intentions, for 
example — to explain their behavior as our own.
It is difficult to accept that de Waal’s approach is parsimo-
nious, even if it seems intuitively correct, since it multiplies 
the number of unverifiable cognitive processes to which we 
are committed. Still, many comparative psychologists have 
(implicitly or explicitly) adopted this principle as an interpre-
tive presupposition in their scientific research. To give only 
one example, Anderson, Gillies, and Lock (2010) describe how 
a group of captive chimpanzees responded to the death of a 
group-member, and they claim that “several aspects of their 
behaviour recall those of mothers with dying infants, and are 
strikingly reminiscent of human responses to peaceful death” 
(R350). They list the different responses of the chimps, fol-
lowed by “possible human counterparts,” including testing for 
vital signs and trying to resuscitate the corpse, and they con-
clude that, like humans, chimpanzees have an “awareness of 
death” (R350, R351). Since David Premack and Guy Wood-
ruff’s (1978) seminal article claiming that chimpanzees have a 
“theory of mind” by which they attribute beliefs, desires, and 
intentions to other individuals, many comparative psycholo-
gists have also designed experiments with the aim of demon-
strating that nonhuman animals (not only chimpanzees) are like 
furry or feathered people — with an understanding of meaning, 
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the ability to represent the future, and cultures that are worthy 
of anthropological study.
Language and Cognition
Unfortunately, when researchers conceive of animal minds 
as variations on the human mind, they misunderstand the func-
tion of language in the having of mental states. Without lan-
guage — or, more precisely, without our way of conceptualiz-
ing ourselves and the world through language — animals can-
not be said to engage in cognitive processes that are anything 
like human thinking. R. G. Frey makes this point with regard to 
the seemingly basic ability of all sentient beings to have inter-
ests. According to Frey (1980), animals are incapable of having 
interests, or even having basic desires (as a kind of interest), 
because in order to have interests, animals must be able to have 
beliefs, and in order to have beliefs, they must have language. 
Insofar as they lack language, then, they also lack interests. 
Donald Davidson makes a similar claim: animals cannot have 
beliefs because the mental concepts necessary for beliefs, in-
cluding the capacity to have the concept of a belief and the abil-
ity to interpret the intentionality of others (who hold the subject 
to account for what he or she claims), are too intellectually rich 
for nonlinguistic animals to have (Davidson 1975, 1985; Fel-
lows 2000).
A simple thought experiment will illustrate their claims. 
Imagine that you are eating at the dinner table, and your dog 
comes up and sits next to you. You may say, “He wants some 
food.” That sounds simple enough. However, for this to make 
sense, the dog would have to have a number of constituent be-
liefs: “There is food on the table.” (A belief about objects and 
relationships between objects.) “This discomfort I feel is a sign 
of hunger.” (A causal claim: lack of food causes pain.) “I can 
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get the food by sitting here.” (Practical reasoning.) “Sitting 
here will motivate the person to give me food.” (Understanding 
intentional action by another person.) And so on. The problem 
is that the dog is incapable of believing anything because there 
is no sense in which he can assent to or even understand a de-
clarative sentence such as “There is food on the table.” And if 
he does not believe that there is food on the table, then there is 
no way for him to want the food on the table. Animals are in-
capable of having beliefs because, among other things, they are 
incapable of having second-order thoughts about their percep-
tions — namely, that their perceptions may or may not track the 
world. Therefore, any animal that lacks language lacks beliefs. 
And any animal that lacks beliefs lacks desires.
This is not to deny that animals try to fulfill their basic needs, 
including the need to eat. But to label an animal’s inner state 
(that gives rise to a behavior) as a desire is to equate it with a 
mental event in humans that is very different from what must 
be the cognitive process in animals. Although all animals (in-
cluding humans) have instincts that motivate them to engage 
in rigidly defined behaviors, only human beings have what 
can properly be called desires, which we consciously accept 
or reject, which we invest with psychological significance, and 
which are interpreted and transformed in idiosyncratic ways 
based on social conditions. For example, a hungry newborn 
seeks out a breast, whether it is a human child or a giraffe, but 
only in human beings does this basic instinct take on meaning 
within a web of beliefs and give rise to a plurality of expres-
sions, including eating disorders, fetishes, and other psycho-
logically powerful associations.
Many people’s first impulse is to dismiss Frey and Davidson 
as reflexive anthropocentrists. However, in order to rebut their 
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claims, one must attribute a kind of rudimentary cognition to 
animals that is independent of language, and this depends on a 
wrongheaded assumption that language and thinking are only 
contingently (and not essentially) related. Thus many people 
believe that animals think, and think much as we do, even 
though they do not have the language to express their think-
ing. Cameron Buckner (2013), for example, claims that animal 
cognition and human cognition could be compared as long as 
“we do our best to provide animals with learning histories and 
cultural scaffolding comparable to those enjoyed by the human 
subjects purported to satisfy the [competence] criteria” (866). 
To test for a theory of mind among chimpanzees, then, he sug-
gests that we study wild (non-captive) chimpanzees just as we 
study “free-ranging” humans, observe chimpanzees interacting 
with other chimps (and not in relation to human researchers) 
just as we observe humans interacting with other humans, and 
so on (866) — as if a chimpanzee in the wild has the same “cul-
tural scaffolding” when it comes to understanding themselves 
and others that a human has who is immersed, more or less 
since birth, in linguistic concepts that define human thinking.
Contrary to the assumption that thinking and language are 
separable in principle, we have come to understand how deeply 
our thinking is shaped and even made possible by language. 
This is one of Wittgenstein’s revolutionary insights. Sometimes 
we pretend that, when we first learn language, we are assigning 
words to concepts that we already have. Wittgenstein claims 
that this account of language, as a vehicle for thought, only 
really makes sense if we already have a language (2009). Our 
language picks out the features of reality that matter (to our 
culture or linguistic group) and ignores others. What we do 
not have language for remains inarticulate, undetermined, and 
obscure — not really thoughts at all. To think of language as 
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the act of labeling objects, including mental objects (whatever 
that means), conceives of us as spectators, viewing the world 
and putting names to things. Instead, according to Wittgenstein, 
language is a “form of life” (2009, §§19, 23, 241). In this vein, 
Daniel Dennett (1995, 1997) has appealed to language, and the 
deep ways in which language and experience are intertwined, 
to deny that animal consciousness (if there is such a thing) is 
anything like human consciousness.
In response to philosophers such as Frey and Davidson, some 
cognitive ethologists, comparative psychologists, and philoso-
phers have argued that animals do in fact have rudimentary 
concepts and even beliefs. Bernard Rollin is typical. He gives 
the example of a dog that sees what appears to be water: “An 
animal may see shimmering on asphalt and believe it to mean 
water (even as we do), but he is ‘publicly’ corrected when he 
reaches the road and finds no water there” (Rollin 1990, 141). 
According to Rollin, a dog has the same kind of mental expe-
rience that humans have (“even as we do”) when one of our 
beliefs is challenged. “The dog approaches the road, thinking 
that there is water there” — that is how we would think if we 
perceived what the dog is perceiving. When the dog discovers 
that there is no water, he changes his belief: “There is no water 
there.” He asserts something else, much as we would upon dis-
covering the mirage. And even though the dog does not engage 
other language users to correct this belief — which Davidson 
thinks is necessary for the having of beliefs — Rollin insists 
that the belief can be tested (or “‘publicly’ corrected”) in other 
ways, such as confronting the facts of the world.
To justify the claim that dogs or other animals have this kind 
of inner life, there must be some evidence (beyond merely as-
suming de Waal’s principle of evolutionary parsimony) that the 
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behavior can only be explained or can be best explained by 
appealing to mental concepts. There is no such evidence here. 
More likely, the dog approaches something that looks like wa-
ter because, when it has done so in the past, it has been able to 
drink. Its behavior has been reinforced with positive stimuli. 
The dog walks away because the shimmering on the asphalt 
cannot quench its thirst. We need not assume that there is a be-
lief present in order to explain the dog’s actions. A simpler ex-
planation in terms of behavioral conditioning does just as well.
Descartes claims that language serves as a sign that indicates 
the existence of thoughts behind it (Descartes 1985, 140-41; 
1991, 302-3, 366). We can reject this conception of language 
and still insist that, without language, animals cannot have the 
complex system of beliefs that is necessary for them to have 
desires. However, if animals have no desires, then it does not 
make sense to say that animals suffer, because they have no 
desires that are frustrated. Here is where the refusal to apply 
mental concepts to animals seems to lead to absurd conse-
quences. Even if animals are incapable of beliefs, evolutionary 
continuity and common sense support the hypothesis that many 
animals experience pain. Vertebrate animals have nervous sys-
tems that are similar to ours, endogenous opioids appear under 
physical stress, and they respond to harmful stimuli much as 
we do, with cries or attempts to escape the cause of the pain. 
In addition, the mammalian pain system has distinct sensory 
and affective pathways that can be dissociated pharmacologi-
cally and surgically. This has led numerous researchers to claim 
that all vertebrates, and perhaps some invertebrate animals, are 
pain-conscious (sentient) organisms (Allen et al. 2005; Shriver 
2006). Given the many physiological and behavioral similari-
ties, it seems appropriate to apply de Waal’s principle of evolu-
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tionary parsimony and conclude that all vertebrates, human and 
nonhuman, are able to experience pain.
We like to think that we can isolate the feeling of pain from 
our interpretation of pain. For example, although most research-
ers working on animal cognition tend to use “pain” and “suf-
fering” interchangeably (Dawkins 1980, 1990), Dennett tries 
to differentiate the immediate feeling of “pain” from concept-
laden “suffering.” He claims that some nonhuman animals may 
be capable of pain, “depending on how we choose to define 
that term,” but they cannot suffer because they “lack the sort 
of over-arching, long-term organization that leaves room for 
significant suffering” (Dennett 1995, 707-8). Temple Grandin 
makes a similar distinction between “the sensory component of 
pain” and “feelings about the pain,” which she also calls “suf-
fering” (Grandin 2005, 180-87). Like Descartes, Dennett and 
Grandin assume that language merely labels inner phenomena 
that stand apart from and are unaffected by the language that 
we use. Pain is some fact of the matter that is transformed into 
suffering through the activity of thinking in terms of concepts. 
However, we cannot have an experience, including the feeling 
of pain, apart from concepts. Our subjective experiences are 
temporally situated by us in a narrative and are made sense of 
using conceptual tools that are made possible by language.
The Pitfalls of Folk Psychology
According to much of the Western philosophical tradition, 
humans are rational beings and animals are nothing but dumb 
brutes. As animals have been shown to engage in sophisticated 
behaviors such as tool use, inferential reasoning, and decep-
tion, however, many cognitive ethologists have assumed that 
animals must be capable of complex mental operations, and 
in fact that their thinking is like ours. Both sides of the debate 
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share a kind of Cartesian logic: they assume that either some 
animals think like humans do or they have no inner life what-
soever. The comparison is always to human cognition. And so, 
researchers on animal cognition tend to describe animals in hu-
man terms, as having a theory of mind, beliefs, and a certain 
rudimentary kind of rationality, on par with what humans have 
at a particular stage of mental development. Rather than ques-
tioning the Cartesian dichotomy, they simply draw the line dif-
ferently, bringing some animals over to the side that had been 
populated exclusively by humans.
We ought to resist both alternatives, neither of which can 
accommodate evolutionary continuity and the crucial (espe-
cially linguistic) differences between humans and nonhuman 
animals. Instead of animals having no interests and desires, or 
having interests and desires like we do, there is a third possibil-
ity: that animals have mental states, including what we may 
call desires (for lack of a better term), but not desires in any 
sense that we would recognize if we had them. One can see 
here that language runs aground. We do not know what to call 
whatever it is that animals have, because we can only grasp the 
subjective character of our own inner lives. How do we make 
sense of this? Given our ways of thinking and our language, 
we seem not to know how to comprehend animal cognition 
without either making it nothing (anthropodenial) or likening 
it to what we experience (anthropomorphism), both of which, I 
have shown, are forms of anthropocentric bias.
When Dennett considers whether animals have a point of 
view on their own experiences, he poses a rhetorical question: 
“When we consider a creature that isn’t a teller — has no lan-
guage — what happens to the supposition that one of its stories 
is privileged?” (Dennett 1995, 704). Given the inability of ani-
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mals without language to conceptualize themselves and their 
experiences (at least in the same way that we do), attempts to 
understand animal cognition using our own mental predicates 
is hopelessly misguided. It is hardly illuminating to talk about 
consciousness in animals at all, given that consciousness in 
humans is so ill-defined, but calling animal consciousness a 
“primary” or “primitive” form of consciousness, or a “precur-
sor” to human consciousness — language that is widely used 
in comparative psychology — does not make the concept more 
precise. Johan Bolhuis and Clive Wynne conclude that such 
comparisons between human and animal mentation stifle prog-
ress in the study of animal cognition: “As long as researchers 
focus on identifying human-like behavior in other animals, the 
job of classifying the cognition of different species will be for-
ever tied up in thickets of arbitrary nomenclature that will not 
advance our understanding of the mechanisms of cognition” 
(Bolhuis and Wynne 2009, 833). Similarly, William Mason 
claims that the use of folk psychological terms covers over our 
lack of understanding when it comes to human mental process-
es: “Mind . . . lacks ‘thing quality’; it is but a construct, hardly 
more than a label, really, for complex processes and functions 
that we are still far short of understanding in any creature, in-
cluding ourselves” (Mason 1976, 931). Because we describe 
our own cognitive processes in ill-defined, unscientific terms, 
the anthropomorphic tendency to understand animal cognition 
in human terms is bound to confuse rather than illuminate.
Anthropomorphism is so compelling because we continue to 
define the human mind in folk psychological terms. By appeal-
ing to folk psychology, however, we are using a form of expla-
nation that is confused to begin with, and we simply extend it 
to animals. According to Allen and Beatrix Gardner, this leaves 
comparative psychologists with two possible explanations of 
Matthew C. altMan
40
© Between the Species, 2015
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 18, Issue 1
what they are doing when they attribute mental concepts, es-
pecially the notion of intentionality, to animals: “To the extent 
that intention only stands for a correlation between an internal 
stimulus and an external response, it explains nothing. On the 
other hand, to the extent that human beings are explaining their 
behavior when they speak of intentions . . . their explanations 
can be as false as any other explanations” (Gardner and Gard-
ner 1986, 480). The former interpretation is the most charitable 
reading of what anthropomorphic researchers are doing: attach-
ing a poorly understood mental label to a well-understood be-
havioral phenomenon. The problem is that many researchers 
take themselves to be doing the latter: making claims about 
the internal lives of animals based on behavioral research, 
inferential claims that are either true or false. When they do 
this, their inferences about animal cognition are at best false 
because of the absence of a shared language between humans 
and animals. Worse than that, such claims may be unfalsifiable 
nonsense, given the challenges facing our attempts to define 
folk psychological terms in ways that are scientifically respect-
able (Churchland 1988; Churchland and Churchland 1996). As 
long as researchers insist on referring to subjective states as 
hallmarks of mindedness, they cling to a theory that inevitably 
limits what they can reliably say about animal cognition.
The Promise of Methodological Functionalism
To make real progress in comparative psychology, with-
out the intellectual baggage of (the two forms of) anthropo-
centrism, researchers ought to adopt a functional approach to 
mind — not necessarily as a theory of what the mind is, but as 
a methodological presupposition. That is, researchers studying 
animal cognition should talk about environmental inputs, the 
functional role of internal states, and behavioral outputs rather 
than attributing humanlike psychological concepts to animals, 
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and they should remain agnostic about what kind of subjec-
tive states animals have. If we cannot find a way around folk 
psychological concepts — if, as Pamela Asquith claims, “an-
thropomorphism is unavoidable or inevitable” because etholo-
gists are bound by “established semantic fields in ordinary hu-
man discourse” (Asquith 1984, 139, 145) — then such con-
cepts should be understood as shorthand descriptions of inner 
states (whatever they are) that play the same functional roles 
for humans and animals. Mental properties are replaced by or 
reduced to functional properties.
A functionalist methodological approach allows us to re-
main agnostic about folk psychological similarities, neither to 
deny them nor to attribute them across species, while continu-
ing to study animal cognition and its relation to human cogni-
tion. This approach may sound similar to the recent sugges-
tion by Kristin Andrews that researchers ought to start from the 
bottom-up rather than by assuming cognitive similarities from 
the beginning that are then justified by empirical research:
empirical research on animal cognition aims to deter-
mine which attributions are truly attributable to differ-
ent species, whereas the charge of anthropomorphism 
is a pre-empirical obstacle to this research. Rather than 
focusing on the obstacle, I suggest that we ignore it as 
a prejudice, and instead work on developing methods 
for testing the applicability of specific properties. (An-
drews 2009, 52)
Andrews’s approach is promising. The problem is that em-
pirical methods can, at best, establish functional states and not 
subjective, cognitive states, which seem, after all, to be what 
Andrews is after: to validate the attribution of subjective men-
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tal traits (or “properties”) across species. Researchers cannot 
“ignore” anthropocentrism as long as they seek ultimately ei-
ther to apply or to withhold folk psychological concepts on the 
basis of empirical research — that is, either transforming ani-
mals into feathered or furry humans, or excluding them from 
the community of thinkers because they do not think like we 
do. As long as Andrews and others define mental properties 
in folk psychological terms, they are not discoverable and an-
thropocentric projections are inevitable. Researchers can best 
get beyond anthropocentrism by putting aside the terminology 
that inevitably defines animals in relation to humans’ subjective 
mental states.
By focusing on functional similarities, researchers will be 
able to explore evolutionary continuity between humans and 
animals without reducing one to the other. Consider pain once 
again. If we define pain as a subjective feeling, then animals 
can only experience pain if they have the state of consciousness 
that we have when we are in pain. However, it is more scientifi-
cally tenable to understand pain in functional terms. If the ani-
mal’s inner state serves the same function as the feeling of pain 
does in human beings — if there is a similar causal relationship 
between sensory inputs, internal states, and behavioral outputs 
as there are in humans — then the organism is in pain, no mat-
ter what the animal’s subjective experience is. Philosophers 
such as Frey, who deny that animals feel pain, assume that pain 
is a feeling that must be set in relation to certain beliefs. But 
some animals, most notably vertebrates, have inner states that 
serve the same adaptive function as the feeling of pain does for 
us. Because of that, they can be said to be in pain, functionally 
construed, regardless of what they “feel” — that is, regardless 
of whether their subjective mental state is the same as ours.
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Many evolutionary anthropologists have begun to take this 
approach in their research, eschewing mental terms in favor 
of functional criteria for making comparative claims. For ex-
ample, Redouan Bshary’s studies on fish and bird cognition 
examine the decision rules that give rise to social cooperation, 
tool use, and anti-predator behavior. And he suggests that these 
findings may be used to explain seemingly more complex pri-
mate behavior, without appealing to belief-desire formations 
(Bshary, Wickler, and Fricke 2002; Tebbich and Bshary 2004; 
Penn 2011). With the shift to a functionalist methodology, the 
comparison between human minds and animal minds becomes 
possible. Sensory inputs, neurochemical states, and behavioral 
outputs are able to be studied empirically across species. Com-
parative psychologists would still be studying animal cogni-
tion, but cognition understood in functional rather than folk 
psychological terms.
Despite the dubious scientific value of folk psychology, 
some functionalists, most notably David Lewis (1966, 1972) 
and D. M. Armstrong (1993), think that mental concepts could 
be identified with functional concepts. If that were to happen, 
however, the matchup would be species-specific rather than 
across species. For example, intentionality may serve a par-
ticular functional role for humans, but may not serve the same 
role for other animals, even if intentionality could (somehow) 
be attributed to them. There are individual but not universal 
type-type identities, so that, even if we talk about propositional 
attitudes as functional states giving rise to certain behaviors 
(the belief-desire model) generally in humans, the explana-
tion would not apply to nonhuman animals. Therefore, even 
comparative psychologists who cling to folk psychology ought 
to forego such ill-defined mental terms with reference to ani-
mal mentation. The attributions made by philosophers and re-
Matthew C. altMan
44
© Between the Species, 2015
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 18, Issue 1
searchers such as Singer, Regan, Vauclair, Call, Premack and 
Woodruff, and Bekoff would then become something other 
than anthropocentric projections.
Conclusion
Some animals can be said to experience pain and have in-
terests, to make inferences, and to have an awareness of death. 
Such claims are supportable as long as they are equivalent to 
discernible functional similarities, but they are not supportable 
if they are supposed to be inferences about animals’ subjective 
mental states, discovered on the basis of similar behaviors in 
humans and animals. When comparative psychologists adopt 
functionalism as a methodological assumption, they can help 
us to advance beyond anthropocentrism, to see the common-
alities among humans and animals, and to conceive of animal 
cognition on its own terms.
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